The aftermath of the Gaza war will determine the trajectory of US-Egypt relations

The Egyptian Parliament also voiced its disapproval of Trump’s idea, describing it as “a grave threat” to regional security and stability.  

Trump’s proposal has also been met with disdain from many Egyptians on social media despite his efforts to promote the idea as serving Gazans’ best interests.

On January 27, two days after his first proposal, Trump described Gaza as a “demolition site,” adding, “you can get people living in areas that are a lot safer—and a lot more comfortable.” He continued by saying that the proposal would help Gazans “live without disruption . . . and violence.” Trump also reportedly said, referring to Sisi, “I’ve helped him a lot and I hope he’ll help us.” 

But that doesn’t seem likely; it took Sisi several days before he finally broke his silence on January 29, expressing his outright rejection of Trump’s offer at a press conference with visiting Kenyan President William Ruto. Sisi called the forced displacement of Gazans “an injustice,” adding that Egypt could never be part of such a move. He continued, “regarding what is being said about the displacement of Palestinians, it can never be tolerated or allowed because of its impact on Egyptian national security.” 

Sisi’s words were an affirmation of his earlier stance vis-à-vis the relocation of Palestinians to Egypt. Sisi has warned that transferring Gaza refugees to Sinai is “a red line” that would threaten Egypt’s national security. Sisi has also cautioned that displacing Palestinians could ignite war with Israel, alluding to concerns cited by some Egyptian officials that if a large number of Palestinians were relocated to Sinai, they might turn it into a staging area for attacks on Israel, prompting Israeli reprisals. His comments were in response to calls by Israel’s far-right for the expulsion of Palestinians to Sinai.   

Hisham Kassem, a publisher and activist, told me that Trump’s proposal to transfer Palestinians to Egypt is “unrealistic,” and the US president’s wish may be difficult to fulfill as Sisi would likely face stiff resistance at home should he side with Trump.   

“It could’ve worked if Trump had discussed the matter secretly with Sisi, but now that the information has been made public, there is too much at stake for Sisi,” Kassem argued. Public discontent is growing in Egypt due to a dire economic crisis and double-digit inflation, and Kassem noted that it would be “a grave mistake” to give the public another reason to be angry.

“But there would also be opposition from other Arab states in the region that have already rejected the plan, such as Saudi Arabia,” Kassem noted, adding that the Egyptian leadership is right to focus instead on the two-state solution to resolve the conflict once and for all. He believes the war that lasted for more than fifteen months has provided “a window of opportunity” to restart peace talks, as both sides to the conflict are licking their wounds after suffering heavy losses.  

Meanwhile, a Trump executive order temporarily halting foreign development assistance and calling for a review of aid programs’ efficiencies and consistency with US foreign policy stirred controversy worldwide. Following the executive order, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio told officials and US embassies abroad that the State Department would temporarily pause existing foreign assistance—except emergency food aid and military funding for Israel and Egypt—in order to conduct the review. 

Egypt receives about $1.3 billion in foreign military assistance from the United States annually. It also receives significant economic and development assistance from Washington, which would be subject to the aid freeze and the review.

“Egypt takes immense pride in the fact that it is the second largest recipient of US military aid in the region after Israel,” Kassem noted. He added, “This gives Egypt political clout in its dealings with other countries.” At a time when the country is facing a severe economic crisis, it is also in desperate need of economic assistance to avert unrest.    

The military aid exemption was seen by analysts as linked to Cairo’s role in maintaining security in the region; some also believed the exemption was meant to ensure that Egypt upholds its peace treaty with Israel.  

Samir Ragheb, a retired army general and political commentator, told me he believes the US decision is linked to the strong security cooperation between the United States and Egypt, particularly in the area of counterterrorism. In a January 23 phone call with Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty, Rubio stressed the importance of “close cooperation to advance post-conflict planning for the governance and security of Gaza,” according to a State Department readout of the call.  

During a press conference with visiting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on February 4, Trump stirred further controversy in Egypt when he announced that the US would “take over the Gaza Strip;” he did not rule out the possibility of sending US troops to fill the security vacuum in the enclave. While much about the proposal is unclear—and senior officials have tried to walk parts of it back—analysts expect Trump to discuss details of the controversial idea with Sisi, including during a reported scheduled visit to Washington later in February. Such analysts say Trump will use US leverage to persuade Sisi to take in at least some of Gaza’s 1.8 million residents so that the US administration can carry out its plan of, as Trump put it, transforming Gaza into “the Riviera of the Middle East.” Whether or not Sisi will bow under US pressure is uncertain, but politician and former Member of Parliament Mohamed Anwar el-Sadat believes Sisi will ultimately cave in to US demands.

“Unlike Saudi Arabia, which has pledged $600 billion in investments in the US, Egypt does not have the means to cash out billions of dollars,” Sadat argued. He added, “Taking in Palestinian refugees is the one thing Egypt can do to avert a fallout with the United States.”  

Indeed, it is in Cairo’s interests to cement ties with Washington: For one, Egypt wants to continue to receive US military aid and development assistance; it also wants to be able to import weapons from the United States should the need arise. (During the first Trump administration, Egypt was among the top ten overall weapons importers in the Middle East, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, with the majority of arms imports supplied by the United States.)

Egypt is also hoping that Trump’s “strongman” policies will bring an end to the Gaza war, ushering in stability in the Middle East. Ending the war could also mean a halt to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, which have caused Suez Canal revenues to diminish significantly. Cairo is eager for the return of the canal’s revenues to their pre-war record-high levels as Egypt badly needs the foreign currency to import wheat and avert default on its crippling foreign debt. 

Cairo would also like to hold on to its regional leadership role, especially as its latest mediation efforts—alongside those of Qatar and the United States—have succeeded in brokering a long-awaited Gaza cease-fire and hostage release deal. The cease-fire went into effect on January 19, boosting Egypt’s standing in the region and giving Gazans some respite from more than fifteen months of a deadly war that has killed more than forty-six thousand Palestinians, according to the Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry. The truce agreed to by Israel and Hamas will also secure the release of dozens of hostages captured by Hamas during its attack on October 7, 2023, thirteen of whom have already been released since the cease-fire went into effect (while five Thai nationals have been freed under a separate agreement). 

Although the relationship between the Sisi government and the United States tends to be trouble-free or at least less tense with a Republican in the White House—largely because Democrat leaders have previously conditioned US aid on progress being made in Egypt’s dire human rights record while Trump turns a blind eye—it looks like the road ahead under the Trump administration may be bumpy still. While Trump, during his first administration, had reportedly called Sisi his favorite dictator and, more recently, had allegedly told reporters that Sisi was his friend, the Egyptian leader’s refusal to go along with Trump’s proposal for Gazan refugees may cause tensions between the two. 

Moreover, US policymakers will need to scrutinize Egypt’s violations of its 1979 peace agreement with Israel by deploying an increased number of Egyptian troops in the Sinai Peninsula. The topic is highly sensitive for Egypt, which got a nod of approval from Israel after the 2011 uprising to deploy additional troops in northern Sinai to rein in Islamist militants. Egypt has since beefed up those military forces several times with Israel’s consent despite the move being in a breach of the Camp David agreement (which limits the number of troops and types of armament Egypt can station in the border area.) 

During the war in Gaza, the Israeli military took over the Philadelphi Corridor and a military official said it located at least twenty underground tunnels built by Hamas, stretching from Gaza to Egypt. The tunnels had likely been used as supply lines by Hamas including for military purposes; Israel also suspects the tunnels may have allowed Hamas fighters to travel in and out of the enclave. The revelation has cast a pall over Egypt-Israel relations, which had been warming in the months and years prior to Israel’s war on Gaza.

It seems likely that the issue of the tunnels may also impact Egypt’s relations with the new Trump administration, as it has raised questions among some analysts about Egypt’s adherence to the peace treaty (the prime reason why the United States sent billions of dollars in military aid and development assistance over the last four decades.) Any talk about the withdrawal of the additional forces from North Sinai or about a permanent Israeli presence in the Philadelphi Corridor would certainly provoke the wrath of Cairo and get relations with the new US administration off on a wrong footing, an Egyptian security source (who spoke to me on condition of anonymity) warned.  

The alternative to such talks would be to agree with the Sisi government on installing some sort of underground surveillance system that could prevent the exploitation of the border by Hamas and other militant groups. As the Trump administration gets settled in the White House, it is unclear how the US-Egypt relationship will evolve. But how US policymakers react to Egypt’s violations of the peace treaty—and how Sisi reacts react to Trump’s plan to seize control of Gaza—will likely determine which direction US-Egypt relations will take under Trump.    

Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and an independent journalist based in Cairo. A former contributor to CNN’s Inside Africa, Amin has been covering the development in post-revolution Egypt for several outlets, including Index on Censorship and Al-Monitor. Follow her on X: @sherryamin13.

Note: Some Atlantic Council work funded by the US government has been paused as a result of the Trump administration’s Stop Work Orders issued under the Executive Order “Reevaluating and Realigning US Foreign Aid.”

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