On October 3, the United Kingdom agreed to cede sovereignty of the Chagos Islands, including “the strategically important” UK-U.S. Diego Garcia military base, to Mauritius, a tiny but prosperous archipelagic state (PDF) in the “pivotal (PDF)” “Indo-Pacific…theatre of inter-state contestation and competition.” Some UK politicians condemned it as a “dangerous capitulation that will hand our territory to an ally of Beijing.” Indeed, many Western experts believe China seeks to “transform (PDF)” the existing U.S.-led rules-based international order (RBIO) into one that it can dominate, given the Indo-Pacific’s vital geopolitical and socioeconomic importance (PDF) to Beijing.
But such condemnation is premature. A number of observers have argued that the United Kingdom–Mauritius Joint Statement (UKMJS) is a win for the RBIO against such actors. The UKMJS is not a formal treaty, but rather a political agreement pending final treaty negotiations. London and Washington have an opportunity to negotiate a resilient treaty that could simultaneously ensure Diego Garcia’s “surety of tenure (PDF),” help deter Chinese ambitions, and strengthen India’s voice within the RBIO as a partner in competing against China while pursuing its own interests. The devil will be in the details.
A resilient treaty will require careful attention to detail, balancing sovereignty, foreign direct investment, RBIO treaty precedence, Sino-Indian competition, and Chagossians and Mauritians’ own grievances and aspirations.
The UKMJS resolves a nearly six decade-long controversy over Britain’s 1965 unilateral decision to separate the Chagos from Mauritius as independence loomed, expel their population, and construct the primarily U.S.-stationed Diego Garcia. In the UKJMS, Mauritius has agreed to lease Diego Garcia to Britain for a renewable 99 years and prohibit other states from developing a Chagos military presence. Britain has pledged to negotiate comprehensive development packages for both Chagossians and Mauritians and cooperate in maritime security and illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing deterrence. China is the world’s most egregious IUU offender.
A resilient treaty, however, that actually secures these political promises will require careful attention to detail, balancing sovereignty, foreign direct investment (FDI) (PDF), RBIO treaty (PDF) precedence, Sino-Indian competition, and Chagossians and Mauritians’ own grievances and aspirations.
The UKMJS’s critics’ concerns warrant some merit. Since the 1970s, China has provided significant bilateral FDI. In 2017, Mauritians elected current Prime Minister Pravid Jugnauth, who some observers have labeled pro-Chinese.
Geopolitical ambitions, however, rarely match realities. The supposedly pro-Chinese Jugnauth actually proposed (PDF) the 99-year renewable lease. The “Mauritius Miracle (PDF)” owes much of its success to RBIO institutions and Western and Indian FDI since its 1968 independence. Most FDI (PDF) to Mauritius, however, is not “traditional” (e.g., infrastructure, services), but global business company (GBC) revenue. Mauritius collects corporate tax from GBCs seeking domicile. GBCs do not provide Mauritius with the same level of actual FDI as traditional inflows. Most traditional Mauritian FDI, too, is in the real estate sector.
Leasing brings uncertainty. Concerning Diego Garcia, Yuan Yi Zhu, an international relations and law scholar, has argued that “when you have sovereignty, you can get away with anything, really.” “Sovereignty is very powerful; a lease isn’t.” Yet, even within the RBIO, sovereignty is a contested continuum. While the lessor authority may possess de jure sovereignty over a territory, in reality, the lessee authority may enjoy de facto sovereignty.
Precedence suggests that a resilient treaty, supported with sustained deterrence presence, and strategic FDI can help ensure the longevity of a lessee’s de facto sovereignty. Successful precedents exist. U.S. de facto sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, requiring both parties’ agreement to terminate its lease, and UK full sovereignty over its Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus, secured through exhaustive details (PDF) and “what ifs” procedures, demonstrate how this combination can hedge against such future risks as unfavorable regimes. The difference is that these precedents were agreed during official negotiations, not through unilateralism. Fortunately, London and Washington now find themselves in the former, not latter situation.
Strategically leveraging Sino-Indian competition could pay dividends. Some 70 percent of Mauritians are of Indian descent, and Indian advisors are embedded (PDF) throughout the Mauritian government. Once a leading non-aligned state, India is gradually shifting its “geostrategic interests” towards the West owing to China’s competing Indo-Pacific ambitions.
Strategically leveraging Sino-Indian competition could pay dividends.
The West is eager to engage. It was no accident that New Delhi, alongside Washington, was invited to closely facilitate the UKMJS. India consequently stands to gain additional recognition as a major power RBIO proponent in the face of Chinese efforts. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute recently described India as Mauritius’s “de facto security guarantor,” positing that New Delhi may seek to establish a Mauritian (not Chagossian) security presence (potentially Agaléga). This action could bolster both the treaty’s resilience and multilateral deterrence efforts. Only days before its announcement, Britain and France had auspiciously “reaffirm[ed] their support” for a permanent United Nations Security Council seat—an RBIO pillar—for India. If realized, the other “Asian Giant” could side with the West in vetoing Beijing on major issues.
Mauritians, ultimately, will determine their destiny. To uphold its promises, and hence the RBIO and deter Chinese ambitions, London must commit to development packages sensitive to both Chagossians’ reparations (they were excluded from UKMJS negotiations) and Mauritians’ daily lives so as to rebuild trust. This includes, but is not limited to: increasing traditional non-real estate FDI, especially within the World Bank-recommended (PDF) higher education (and services), renewable energy, and health sectors, all of which are UK strengths; prioritizing Chagossians’ reparations; codeveloping effective maritime security (PDF); and establishing transparent benchmarks and dispute resolution pathways. Only then could a UK-Mauritius treaty stand the test of time. The devil will be in the details.
